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fL. A. No. 19336. In Bank. Nov. 6, 1945.] 
DOROTHY K. CUI"LEY, nespondent, T. NEW YORK LIFE 
INSURANCE ('O~rp.ANY (a Corporation), Appellant. 
(1] Insurance - .PI .. miums - Forfeiture for Nonpayment.-A dis-
ability policy provision, that premiums are waived if due 
after receipt of proof of total disability, bas no application 
to a premium rayable b~fore receipt of proof of total disabil-
ity, and nonpll~'m~nt thpTeof Te!'ult!' in the lnp~ing of the 
policy. 
(2) Id.-Actions-Evidellce-DiaabilitJ.-lu all actioll to recover 
disobility bendits und~r a policy, the evidence lupported a 
finding that the insured was totally and presumably perma-
nentl~ disahled prior to the date of default in payment of 
premiums where be had for 80mI' time previously been suffer-
ing froDl cancer and was compelled to forego his usual business 
activities as real estate broker and appraiser. 
(3) Id. - Extent of Lo8S - Accident or Health lusurance - Total 
Diaabillt;v.-"Total disability," within a policy providing for 
(3) When insured. deemed to be totally diaabled, aote8, 24 
A.L.R. 203; 79 A.L.R. 857; 98 AL.R. 780. 
iricK. Dig. Reference: [1] Insur&Dce, § 92; [2] lnsur&Doe, 1293; 
[3] Insurance, 1195; [4] In8urance, 1295; (6) Insurance, ,27 • 
[6-8] Insurance, 1203; [9] Insurance, 160; [10] Insurnn~. 
1203(3); [lll Inaurance, 1241. (12) Abatement, 141; (13) la-
.vance, I 219. 
) 
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payment of disability benefit" on receipt of' th(, requisitl' 
proof, is a disability that prevents the insured from working 
with reasonable continuity in his customary occupatioll or in 
any other occupation with which he might reasonably be ex-
pected to engag-e in vil'w of hi~ o;tAtion and physical and 
mental capacity. 
(4a-4c] Id.-Actions--Evidence-Proof of Lass.-in au action to 
recover disabiI'ity benefits, the evidenee justified a finding that 
due proof of the insured's disability was. furnished on the last 
day of the period pres~ribed in the policy, although the claim 
form filled out in the presence of the insurer's representative 
was not filed with the insurer until the following day, where 
the insurer did not explain why it did not keep a promise 
to make the forms available on an earlier date, and where it 
sent its representative on the last day to enah)1' the insl11'er 
to make proof of disability. 
[6] Id.-Agent8-Imputation to Principal of Agont's Knowledge. 
-The knowledge acquired by the insurer's inspector in the 
course of hi", im·I'~t.i'!ntion of n !'Inint i~ thl' knowledgoe of his 
principal 
[6] ld.-Proof of Loss-Diaability.-The term "due pl'Oof" of dis-
ability, in the absence of a specific requirement in the policy, 
does not require any partieular form of proof which the in-
sured might arbitrarily demand, but only such a statement of 
fact as would require payment of the claim. 
[7] ld.-Proof of Loss-Disabilit7.-Due proof of disability is re-
quired to enable the insurer to form an estimate of its rights 
and liabilities, and what the reasonable requirements for that 
purpose are depends on circumstances of the particular case. 
[S] ld.-Proof of Loss-Disability.-Where a policy providing for 
the payment of disability benefits on receipt of proof of total 
disability contains no express requirement that proof be given 
in writing, such a requirement may not be implied from other 
provisions of the policy requiring receipt at the insurer's home 
office of income payments and waiver of premiums, since such 
provision is not concerned with how proof is to be given, but 
with when benefits are to begin, 
[9] 1d.-Oonuacts-lDterpretation-Aga.inst Inaurer.-Any doubt 
as to the meaning of a policy must be resolved in favor of the 
insured. 
[10] Id.-Proof of Loss-Conclusiveness.-In the absence of es-
toppel, statements of proofs of 1088 are Dot conclusive but 
are subject to explanation and correction. 
[6] Form and contents of proof that will satisfy req11ireDlent of 
"dlle proof of c1iaabilitJ," JUlte, 109 A..L.B. 825. 
~ov. 1!J4j J CULLEY V. l\M\ Y UI~h LIFl!: INS. CO. I8!) 
[17 ~ 187; 1'-1 P.2e! 698) 
[11] Id.-Actions-Conditions Precedent.-An unconditional de-
nial of liability by an insurer after the insured has marl(' claim 
of disability under the policy gives rise to an imlllPrji:ltr ('am(' 
of action, Rnd no tendpT of premiums is necessary. 
f121 Abatement--Death of Party-Contract.- Whcn- a <,ause or 
action for disability bell<'fits aTose whilr the insurerl was ali\'('. 
it. is immutrrini th'nt thE' complaint wns filpn after his dpafh. 
[13] Insurance - Proceeds. - Under a d11;.nbility poliey providiJl~ 
for pnyment of such benefits on receipt of proof of total dis-
abilit~·, there can be no recovery for bell!'fits for any period 
preceding the time of receipt of such proof or the waiver 
thereof by denial of liability after the insured had made claim 
of disahility. 
APPEAl .. from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. John Beardsley, Judge. Modified and 
affirmed. 
Action on an insurance policy. Judgment for plaintiff modi-
fied and affirmed. 
Meserve, Mumper & Hughes and Hewlings Mumper for 
Appellant. 
C. H. Hartke for Respondent. 
TRA YNOR, J .-Plaintiff brought this action to recover thr 
face value and disability benefits of a life insurance poliC':--
issued in 1923 by defendant on the life of plaintiff's husbullcl, 
who died on April 14, 1941, of cancer of the chest. The in-
sured defaulted in the payment of the quarterly premium of 
$70 due on August 20, 1940, and failed to pay the premium 
during the one-month period of grace allowed in the policy. 
On September 22, 1940, defendant agreed to give the insUTNl 
until October 20th to make good the default. The insured 
paid defendant $20 in cash, which gave him term insurance 
at the rate of $2.00 per thousand for one month, and signed 
a S()-called blue note for $50, plus interest, payable on October 
20th. All rights under. the policy were to be restored upon 
payment of the note, whereas failure to pay would make the 
default in the payment of the premium final as of August 
20th. (Eddie v. New York Life Ins. Co., 75 Cal.App. 199 
1242 P. 5011; Talsky v. New York Life Ins. Co., 244 App.Div. 
661 [280 N.Y.S. 69].) The insured failed to pay the note 
) 
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when it fell uue, and on Octohcr 20. I!) to. clef('lI(bnl notified 
him thnthis policy had lapsed. 
Plaintiff relics on sec·tioll ] (4) of the policy, whicll pro-
vides: "Ill the event of default in pllymellt of' prellliulll art('r 
the Insured IlHs berOllic totally disahled, thc poli('~' will 1)(' 
restored upon payment of aJ'J'clil'S of premiulIl with interest 
at 5%, provided due proof that the Insured is tot.ally and 
presumably permanentl~' oisahled, as herein dcfined, is re-
ceived by the Compan~' not later than six months after said 
default and the benefits unoer this section shnll then he the 
"lame as if said default had not oc('urre(1. ,. 'I'llI' t.ria 1 ('onrt 
fonnd that the insured was totally and presumnbl~' perma-
"elltly disabled before .Au~ust 20th: that oefendant received 
,Inc proof of such oi::;nhilitv Oll Fehruary 20. 1941: and that 
:,·fl'lIrlant denied liabiJit~· 'under the poiiC'~-on Fehr1H1r~' 18, 
:!) 11. and thereh~' \\1ah'rd any fllrther preminms. 'I'llI' court 
.' b·o found that 110 premium was 01H' and payable 011 A 11 gust 
.!(). 1940. on the grouno that the in::;ureo was then disabled 
within the mcanin~ of t.he poJiC'y. 'I'he court gave judrrment 
;'.)], the plaintiff in the sum of $10,G32.46, which included dis-
:thility b(>m'fit~ for a fH>rioo of nin(> months nC'ff'ndant ap-
penIs. 
[1] 'I'he tilldillu that no premiulll was Jue and pa~'able 
on August 20. 1940. cannot be sustained. Premiums are 
waived under the policy only if due after receipt of proof 
of total disabilit~,. Since no proof was received until Feh-
ruary. 1941. defendant's contention that the policy laps('d 
for nonpa~'ment of tl1(' AU!rost premium must be upheld. 
The question remains. however, whether the policy was re-
stored under the provisions of section 1 (4-) thereof. 
[2] nefendant contend!" that the trial court's finding that. 
the insured was totaIJ~- and presumably permanently dis-
abled before AU!rost 2n. 1940. is not supported b~' the e\'i-
dence. 'I'he evidence shows without ('onfiiet that for sOllie 
time before 1940 the ins11J'(,o had cancer; that at lea~t since 
the beginning of July. 1940. he suffered severe pain and lost 
weight and strength rapidly: and that he was compelled to 
forgo his usual btl!~iness aeth'ilies ItS real estate broker and 
appraiser. He came to his offi!'e re~nlarly and stayed only 
for short periods. a\'oiding customers. He performed no work 
after .Tul" of 1940 for which he or his firm received any re-
munerati~n. The policy provides that "Disability shall be 
deemed to be total whenever the Insured is whol1y disabled 
Noy. l~Jr)l CULLEY t'. ~I:\\" YOlm LIFE INS. CO. 
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by h()(]il.l· injury or disellse so tlJ:lt he is prevented thereby 
fr()!lJ ('JI~;;I~jng ill ,my oecupation whatsoc\'er for remulleratioJl 
or pl'l)fit." [3] It is settled in this statr that total disabil· 
i1.'· \\'i1hin thr meaning .of this provision is a disahility that 
I 'I'l'\'l'nt~ t lw msur(>(J from H\yorkilE! with reasonn bl(' con-
t illui1.1 ill his Cl1s1oll1nr.l OCC111'<ll inn or jll any other oecu-
patioll in which he might r(>[Iso)whly he ('xpeple(] to ellgage 
ill vic\\' of' his station nnrl pllysical ana mental capacity." 
(En'ecci v. TI'csfrnl Slfllcg Ufr lns. Co., 1!l Ca1.2rl 3R8, 394, 
305 [121 P.2cl (is!). 141A.L.n. 1)81: H1I1-lI'it v. Prudential Ins. 
ro. of .·lmenca. Vi ral.App.2d 74. 81 1113 P.2d 6D11.) A 
finding that the insurNl is tota ]].1' disabled is not preclllded 
b:v th(' fact that he still g'O(,S to his officr irregnlarly and en-
gages sporadically in Imsinrss matters. "According to over-
whelming authority. the term 'totnl disability' does not sig-
nif.l' an absolute state of helplessn('s" but mrans snch a dis-
ability a~ render~ th(> insnrro nnllblp to perform the substan-
tial and mntNinl acts necessary to the prosecution of a busi-
ness or occupation in th(' nsnal or customary way, Recovery 
is not precluded under a total disahility proyision because 
the insured is a ble to perform sporadic tasks, or give atten-
tion to simple or incollseCjuential detail!,; incident to the con-
duct of business." f19 Cll1.2d 388. 396.) The finding of 
the trial court must therefore be upheld. for the evidence 
clearly shows that the conoition of the insured before August 
20, ] 940, prevented him from performing the duties of his 
occupation or an.l· other occnpation in which he might rea-
sonabl~' have been expected to engage. 
[4a] Defendant also contend1> that it did not receiye due 
proof of the insured's disability within six months after his 
default in the pa~'-mel1t of the premium. On February 15, 
] 941. a representath-e of the insured called at defendant's 
Los Angeles office. Hr showed the policy to two of defend-
ant's employees, 011(' of them defendant's supervisor of agen-
cies, and told them that the insureil was critically ill in the 
hospital with cancer' that he intencled to rely on the restora-
tion clause in the polic~-: thllt sinre the premium was in de-
fault since Aug-nst 20th. the six months' period would expire 
on the 20th of February: Imd that it was therefore necessary 
to have immediately the form~ on which to claim disability 
benefits. This conyersation occurreo on Saturday. February 
15, 1941. Both employees replied that they had no fonus at 
that time bnt that th(' forms would be mailed to the office 
') 
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of' the insured "and would he there the first thing Monday 
morning, February 17th." The forms were not mailed as 
promised, hut on the afternoon of F'ehl'uary 20th an inspector 
sent by defendant to investignte the claim called at the office 
of the insured. He brought n form for proof of disability, 
whieh was filler1 out in his presence, and was signed at t.he 
hospital by plaintiff' on behalf of her hushand.The inspector 
inquired of. thp businrss partner of the insured with regard 
to the circumstances of th(' insured's rlisa hility '!md was told 
"substantiaily thp facts with' referencr to Mr. Culle~·."· to 
which the partner testified at the trial. This testimony de-
scribed in detail the decline in the insured's health through-
out 1940. [5] The inspector was sent b~' defendant t.o in-
vestigate the claim, and the knowledge that he acquired in 
the course of his investig-ation is th(' knowledge of his princi-
pal. (Vanciel v. K1lmle. 26 r.lll.2rl7::J2. 7::J4 fI60 P.2d 8021.) 
[4b] In view of this ('Yioence. as to whi('h there is no con-
flict, the trial court was justified in findin/! that due proof of 
the insured's disabilit~, was furnished on February 20th, al-
though the claim form filled out in the presence of the in-
spector was not filed with defendant until the following day. 
The policY does not provide that proof of disability be given 
in writing. [6] It is settled that the term "due proof" of 
disability, in the absence of a specifie requirement in the pol-
icy, "does not require any particular form of proof which the 
insured might arbitrarily demand. but only a statement of 
fact as, if established in eourt would require payment of the 
claim:" (McAndrews v. Prudential Ins. Co., 132 Neb. 332. 
335 r271 N.W. 857. 109 A.L.R. 8211 : Aetna Life Ins. Co: v. 
Tipps. 132 Tex. 213 r121 RW.2r1 3241: Zorger v. Prudential 
1118. Co., 282 TIl.App. 444: 1i'()rman v. New York Life Ins. Co., 
267 Mich. 426 r255 ~.W. 2221: Prunential Ins. Co. v. Litzke, 
36 Del. 592 [179 A. 4921 : 'Wade v. Metropolitan Life In.~. Co.,. 
179 S.C. 70 rI83 S.E. !)891 : see 10H A.L.R. 825: 3 Appleman 
Insurance Law and Practice, § 1444; see, also, Kennedy v. 
Occidental Life Ins. Co., 18 Ca1.2d 627. 631 f117 P.2d 31.) 
[7] Due proof' is required to enable the insurer to form an 
estimate of itR rights and liabilities (O'Ret1ly v. G'Uardian 
J-futual Life Ins. Co .. 60 N.Y. 169 fI9 Am.Rep. 1511: Amer-
ican Nat. Ins. Co. v. Yee Lim Shee, 104 F.2d 688. cert. den. 
308 U.S. 592 [60 S.Ct. 122. 84 L.Ed. 4951: Ha.ba v. Mutual 
Ben. Health & Ace. AsS1I .. 2ROMirh. 531 r273 ~.W. 7951.) 
What the reasonable requirements for that purpose are will 
depend upon the eircustances of the particular case. (See 
) 
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Pr1f(lrnlial Ins. Co. v. IA.tzkc, SU1)1"I1.' [4c] In the present 
case the insured's representative advised defendant of the 
insllre(J's disability and of his intention to base thereon his 
C'Jaim that the poliC'y had not lapsed and that he was entitled 
to disahility bendits He fi1so fl(h-ised defendant that the 
matter was urgent. nefend:mt oi(l not explnin at the trial 
why it din not keep the promisr mfldr to t11r insurc(rs repre-
sent.ative that thr forms wonl(l hr aVflilahlr to tllP insured on 
February 17tll Drfcnonnt .. howev!'r. s!'nt its insprctor on 
t.he afternoon of the 20th. tllr 1n8t da~' of thr six-month pe-
rioo. thns /rivinl! the insnren :m eleventh hour chance to com-
ply with thr relluirrmrnts of the polic~' find to provide de-
fendant with the nc('eSSfiTV informfition. It is ('lear from the 
evidence that the mertinl! 'thfit took place under these circum-
stances was for th(' purpose of mfiking proof of disfihility. 
Defendant contends. however. thfit sincr it was contemplated 
that a formal claim <;honli1 he filro with the immran('e com· 
pany. the informfition Q'iven Ilt the meetinl! on Fehruary 
20th was re,!!ardeil hy the partie!'l as merely preliminary to 
the presentation of written proof. The record discloses that 
the parties rel!arded t.hp meet.inl! "as a matter of making 
a proof of dis a bilit~·." The fact that they also contemplated 
the filing of thp proof in written form does not render inef-
fective the proof previonsly given. 
[8] Although the roli('~' contains no express requirement 
that proof be given in writing'. defendant contends that such 
a requirement shou1<'l he implied from section 1 (3) of the 
poliey which proviile~: "3. Rencfits.-Upon receipt at the 
Company's Home Offi('e. before default in payment of pre-
mium, of due proof that the Insured is totally and presum-
ably permanently disfihled . thE' following benefits will be 
~ranted: (a) Tncomp Payments . . . (b) Waiver of premi-
ums. . .. " This provision is not concerned with how proof 
is to be given. but with when benefits are to begin. The policy 
does not rE'C]uire thllt proof of disability be received at the 
home office of the compan~' before it can be restored. Sec-
tion 1 (4) of the policy provides that it will be restored "pro-
vided dne proof that the Insured is totally and presumably 
permanently disabled. as herein defined. 1S received by the 
Compan~' not later than Rix months after said default." This 
provision requires merel~' that dne proof be "received by 
the ('.omPfiny." not that it be received at its home office. In 
a'J C~ 
) 
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fart it is not ronlf'lIflp,l Il::!1 ,kff'wl:lllt \ Lm .. \ ll'!f'les ilfii,'c 
had 110 nuthority to recci\'c lll'()of of ,1isnllilil.\·. The sPf'cifl . 
... enlion of r('r('ipt nt the h011](' IIrfi('(' in lh(' ]lI'O\'isioll rclnling to 
illrolll(, pnYl11(,Jlls nn(l wnin'l" of pl'(,llliuTrls nIH1 thc omission 
of sl1rll H requirement in t}](' p"o\"ision rdalill~! to ,'('slol'ation 
plninl~' inilicates thnt Sllrh n I'P'Inir(,lll('nt wns 110t int('T\(ll'fl in 
the cnsc of restoration. [9] Tn an~' ('vent llny (1 011 lit ;IS to 
the mellnin~ of thl' poliry 1I111"t hr· 1'1'<;01\'(><1 in fn\'ol' of the 
insllreil I1nd(>r w('l1 known r1l1c'f'; of intrl'nT·(>lntion. (Black-
burn v. flome "1'((> lf1.~. r!o .. 19 f'nL2rl 22G [120 P.2d 311; 
Baine v. <7onfill(,11frr1 .1sslIr. nn .. ~1 rn1.2(1 1 [12!l P.2(1 3%, 
142 A.L.R. 12;JB1.) 
[10] Defrnilant contenr1s thnt plnilltiff flid not prove that 
til(' insured wns totllll~' (lisn hlec1 on A 1H!11st 20. 1 !l40, since the 
writtrn claim shows on its fnl'e tll:lt total ilisnbili1~' ilid not· 
begin until nine ilavs aft(>1' thr poli('~' had lnpsrfl. The writ-
ten form eontninN1 t he follO\\'ill~ qnestion allfl answer: "From 
what date has ~'onr disnhi1it~· pre\'ented ~'0\1 from engag'ing 
in any occupation . whllt,oe\'pr for remun(>rntion or profitT 
August 29. 1940." This question ('alled for a le~al ('onclm;ion 
as to the meanin~ of total ilislI hilitv ani! the date of its com-
mencement (see Err('.Ca v. Wesfer~ Strrf(>s 'Jife Ins. Co .. 19 
Ca1.2d 388, 394 f121 P2d 689. 141 A,L.R. 681), Rnd the an-
swer given was subject to explanation and correction. Au-
g'Ust 29. 1940. was the datE' when Dr. Wilke, under whose care 
the insured remained nntil his death. fir~t rer('ivE'd an (>mer-
genry call to see the insured. who was suffering from an ex-
treme pain in his chest. The insured had bpen under other 
medical care before that time and his health had failed long 
before that particular ni~ht of suffpring. The written form 
also referred to the insureil's failing health before August 
29, 1940. for the qu(>stion as to when the illness leading to the 
insured's disability began was answerro: "Pain began in 
March, 1940. Doctors state t.hat cancer must have begun 
over 2 years ago. Spellt part of time in bed since latter part 
of .June. 1940." Defendant did not rely upon plaintiff's 
written statements but chose instead to make its own inve!'lti-
gation and concluded that total oisahility'ilid not begin until 
December 19. 1940. the date when the insured went to his 
office for the last t.ime. Defendant was familiar with RUb-
stantially the same facts as the trial court. That it appraised 
them differently is immaterial. 
In the absence of estoppel, statements in proofs of loss are 
Dot conclusive. .. A statement in. a proof • • . that is not 
) 
) 
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true UOC~ 1I0t cstop the bCIH'fieiul'Y ax a IllUllCI' or 111\\ where 
the illsurer is not pr<'jlldi('t'cl thrrchy. It is 1lH'l'eiy c\'id('llr(~ 
to Iwcollsi<lt'red and gj',ell such w(·i[!:ht as the jl1l'Y think it 
elltitkd to in cOllllrrtion with all othcr c\'idcllct, in thr ease." 
(()CUlll Accident &- (;wlI'fllllcc' CorI'o V • • 1/'101'('. S;) 1.'.2<1 ;JlifJ, 
::7:.!. (wt. dell. 2!)!) U.8. G09 157 S.Ct. ~:l;;. S 1 L. E(1. Hfl J ; Pirsl 
Sal. Hank v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 27 C.2d 64. i'illl)/'cmc Tent 
1(.O.T .. lI: v. Stensland, 20G Ill. ]24 I GS·:-\.E. 1()!18, fl9 Am.St. 
Hep. 137] ; IJarrill{/ton Y. Southc'/"n Surety Co., ~06 lowa 92:> 
[2~1 N.W. 57~); Gass v. CmnmOntl'Nllth Casualty Co., 113 
Kan. 510 1214 P. 11]5J ; Pnldentiallns. Co. v. Kendrick, 2H2 
K~·. 297 [flO S.W.2d 52): Spencer v. Citizens' M. L. Ins. Assn., 
]42 N.Y. GOG 137 N.B. 617) ; Wade v . . l1ctr01Joliian Life Ins. 
Co., supra; Clm'ke v. T1'Gvelcrs' Ins. Co., 94 Vt. 383 [111 A. 
4-l-fl]; Armstrong v.Modern Woodmen of America, 93 "Tash. 
3;)2 [160 P. 946, Ann.Cas. 1918E 263] ; see Appleman, op; cit., 
§§ 1471-1474 and 7 Courh, Cyeloprdia of Insurance JJaw, 
_§ 1[;56.) 
l\' achtel v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., ~66 N.Y. 345 [194 
N.E. 850], on which defendant relies, is clearly distinguish-
able. In that case the policy provided for double indemnity 
upon due proof that "death .•. resulted from bodily in-
juries caused... exclusively . . . by accidental means." 
The proof submitted to the insurance company stated that 
the insurcd had died of coronary ~hrombosis. In faet death 
rcsulted from an accidental injury. ReeoY(;'r~' of the double 
. indemnity was denied on thc ground that "a party required 
by contract to submit proof of certain facts as a .!ondition 
of liahility, does not perform the condition by submitting 
throug-h error proof that these facts do not exist." (266 
X.Y. 345, 351.) III the Wachtel ease the plaintiff failed to 
furnish all~' proof of accidental death, the risk insured against. 
III the present case ample proof of total disability was gh'en 
tog-ether with an answer to a question that was at most an 
admission. The opinion in the Wachtel case declares, in con-
formity with thc overwhelming weight. of authority that" Ad-
missions, in proofs of claims to insurance companies, like 
other admissions, are subject to explanation. They are not 
conclusive, and proof may be presented that they are errone-
ous." (266 N.Y. 345,351.) 
[11] This action is l10t barred, as defendant contends, 
on the (Zl'ound th(1t the inf:l11'('d failed to pay the arrears 
in prcmium with interest or that the complaint was filed 
) 
) 
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after his deatb. 'l'he rcstoration cIa liS!' requires <ll'I'Cal'S in 
premium to be paid with 5 per c('nt illt crest hill do('s not 
specify any period within which surll paylJlL'lIt must be 
made, "'hell theiJIsllJ'L'(] filed his (·laim 1'01' <lisahilit,\' :"'lIcfi1.s 
with dl'friJdarit, he did not tender the ~O\'('lllh('l' ~Olh pre-
mium but tendered a cheel, for the Allgust 20th pl'emium 
and interest, whirh defendant refused to accept. Sinr(' de, 
fendant was not entitled to the arrears of premium unless 
the policy was restored. it was reasonahle for the insllred 
to wait until his <'Iaim was pas~ed upon hcforr tendering 
any payment. On March 10, 1!l41, defendant made its posi-
tion known. It denied liability. not on the ground that no 
payment had yet heen made, but on the ground that total 
disability had not begun until after default. Such uncon-
ditional denial of liahility gave rise immediately to a cause 
of action and rendered an~' tender of premiums unneces-
sary. (Farnum v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 83 Cal. 246 [23 P. 869, 
17 Am.St.Rep. 233] ; ]fc('onough v. Home Ins. Co., 155 Cal. 
659 [102 P. 8J4, 1R Ann.Cas. 8621; Wilkinson v. Standard 
Ace. Ins. 00., 180 Cal. 252 [180 P. 6071 j metlin v. General 
American Life Ins. Co.; 4 Ca1.2rl 336 r 49 P.2d 5901: Grant 
v. Sun Indemnity Co., 11 Ca1.2d 438 [80 P.2d 9961 : Paez 
v. Mut'UOl Indent. ctc. Ins. Co., 116 Cal.App. 654 [3 P.2d 
69].) [12] Since the cause of action arose while the 
insured was alive, it is immaterial that the complaint was 
filed after his death. Anderson v. New York Life 111.mmnce 
Co., 64 Ca1.App.2d 798 [149 P.2d 4G2], and Johnson v. 
Mutual Life Tnsurance Co .. 70 F.2d 41, are distinguishable 
on the ground that in those cases the insnreo iliff not 1'nrnish 
proof of disabilit~· before his death, 
[13] The trial court erroneously awal'dcd disability 
benefits for a period of nine months preceding the death 
of the insured. Disability payments under the policy were 
to begin onl~' upon receipt of proof of disability at the com-' 
pany's home office. Such proof was not received there until 
March 3, 194]. If, however, the trial court was correct in 
finding that the defendant denied liability on February 18, 
1941, the obligation to pay disability benefits began that day, 
for the denial of liability amounted to a waiver of the 
requirements that proof be submitted. The letter, dated 
Februa~' 13, 194], in which defendant notified the insured 
that the policy had no further insurance value was received 
on February 18, 1941. That letter, however, was written 
,ill answer to an inquiry from the insured without a.D.T. 
) 
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knowledge on defendant's part that the insured was dis· 
abled. When it was written, the policy had no further in-
surance value unless the iDBured had been totally disabled 
as far back as August 20, 1940. Disability wu not men-
tioned in September, 1940, when the insured gave defendant 
his note for the August premium. Nor was it mentioned 
in October, 1940, when the insured gave defendant his check 
in payment of that note or in the same month when he paid 
a premium on another policy, although he could have 
avoided that payment by filing proof of disability. Finally, 
disability was not mentioned even in the inquiry as to the 
status of the policy, which defendant answered in its letter 
of February 13, 1941. While the insured was under no duty 
to furnish proof of total disability before February 20, 1941, 
defendant was under no duty to suggest to hUn that his 
policy might be restored under conditions that it had no 
reason to believe existed. 
The judgment is modified to provide for deduction 01. an 
amount equal to the premiums due August 20th and Novem-
ber 20th, 1940, with interest at 5 per cent to date of judgment 
and for recovery of disability benefits from March 3d, 1941. 
As so modified, the judgment is affirmed; plainWf to re-
cover her costs on appeal. 
Gibson, C .• 1., Carter, J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., Nourse, 
J., pro tern., and Peters, J.t pro tern., concurred. 
